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Abstract 
 
High-technology starters do not operate in a vacuum and innovation is not a solitary activity. 
The activities of technology-based firms are embedded in socio-economic networks with 
other companies, investors, universities, vocational institutions, etc. The geographical 
proximity of those institutions and infrastructural hubs will partly play a role in determine the 
location of ICT firms decision. Furthermore, many high-tech companies shape clusters around 
areas where their major customers are located. The topic of this paper is regional clustering 
Enright, 1992; Rosenfeld, 1997within the context of Internet and ICT technology. A dynamic 
model previously developed for the analysis of ICT-entrepreneurship and networking will be 
applied to make a critical analysis of five ICT-clusters in the Netherlands and Flanders 
(Northern part of Belgium): the Louvain Technology Corridor, Flanders Language Valley, 
Amsterdam Alley, Dommel Valley, and Twente. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The inspiring examples for promoting successful technology clusters are often found in the 
small business districts of Italy and Germany, and in Silicon Valley, where shared identity, 
craft-based skills, regional specialisation and networks of local sourcing, have produced a 
dynamic and flexible ecology (Best, 1990; Grabher 1993a; Saxenian, 1994). Those techno-
industrial districts have a well-developed infrastructure of supportive institutions, promoting 
variety among capabilities, firms and organisational forms (Van de Ven, 1993). As 
convincingly argued by Grabher (1993b; 1993c), the institutional embeddedness of those 
business districts, however, has to be moderate (social ties should bind, not blind) and 
dynamic (avoiding rigid specialisation and functional and socio-political lock-ins or chaos 
from arising). For instance, Glasmeier (1994) discusses the example of the traditional Swiss 
watch industry which proved vulnerable to severely external shocks in the 1970s and early 
1980s. The advent of quartz technology, the subsequent introduction of new production 
systems, and global competition replaced its tradition of precision manufacturing, mechanical 
craft skills and indigenous collaboration. The arrival of the electronic watch, associated with 
far-reaching automation and the global search for economies of scale, forced the gates of the 
then complacent and relatively inert Swiss watch cluster to open. 
 
There is a large number of analyses that looks at why certain regions are successful in 
creating an innovative technology cluster (e.g. Rosenberg, 2002; Castells & Hall, 1994; Lee et 
al., 2000, Kenney, 2000). In some cases it is an internationally renowned university that 
inspires engineers and scientists to become entrepreneurs (e.g. Cambridge University), in 
others it is a large core company outsourcing many activities to smaller companies that 
together can serve as a region’s catalyst (Fairchild Semiconductor and Intel in Silicon Valley). 
Also an active government can stimulate indigenous clusters by making local resources and 
funds available (e.g. risk capital, high-quality infrastructure), attracting foreign firms to 
invest, and building ties with Silicon Valley (e.g. Hsinchu Taiwan) (Mathews, 1997.  
 
In the documents of governments on innovation policy, increasing attention is paid to the 
(potentially) dynamic role to be played by thriving high technology firms and entrepreneurial 
universities and research institutions and the dynamic growth patterns they (can) bring about 
(CEC 1995; 1997; 1998; Van den Brande 1995; Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1999). 
The academic literature, more interested in the causes of the outstanding performance of some 
of those emerging high technology regions, refers to the successful collaboration between 
local universities and research laboratories and established high-technology companies and a 
large number of new firms in so-called innovative milieux (Castells & Hall 1994).’ This 
process of collaboration, including spontaneous cross-fertilisation, local/regional spin-offs 
and spill-overs, outsourcing and strategic partnering, may ultimately lead towards constant 
innovation and an ongoing knowledge transfer between the major public and private 
stakeholders in the region.  
 
We will describe a cluster as a geographical concentration of mutually dependent companies 
with vertical as well as horizontal and cooperative as well as competitive relational patterns, 
with companies often operating within the same industry or on the basis of the same basic 
technology (Jacobs & De Man 1996). When the clustering of companies takes place within 
high-tech sectors (e.g. biotechnology, new materials, ICT) terms like technopole and 
technopolis are also used (Castells & Hall 1994). Besides looking at (the potential of) spill-
overs in a dynamic network of larger companies and new start-up firms, attention is also 
given to the importance geographical concentration and proximity of technology firms, 
investors, universities, and other supportive institutions, leading to local networking and 
clustering. Porter (1998) has argued that those clusters of geographically proximate group of 
interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field are important to 
stimulate competition, growth and innovation. As argued by Jacobs (1984) and Glaeser et al. 
(1992), both technological specialization and competition at the regional level may simply not 
be good enough, instead intra- and inter-industry variety and diversity may ultimately be more 
productive in accomplishing and sustaining growth. In this respect, large diversified cities, 
with their intrinsic multitude of opportunity structures stimulating the cross-fertilisation of 
ideas and technological spill-overs, are more successful in speeding up innovation and being 
conducive to an economic take-off, than small and/or specialized technology districts.  
 
Policy makers and entrepreneurs in Western Europe and elsewhere have come up with plans 
and measures to promote start-up firms and techno-industrial districts in newly emerging 
industries, such as Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), biotechnology and 
new materials. For instance, politicians, civil servants, entrepreneurs and investors who 
concern themselves with the significance of ICT with regards to regional economic 
development, are primarily interested in the possibilities for growth of the local economy and 
in positive effects on employment. The increasing relevance of the ICT and multimedia 
sectors for the regional and national economy, is illustrated in several studies (e.g. Braczyk, 
1999; Cooke 2002; Larosse et al. 2001; Den Hartog & Maltha (1998). Together with other 
European and South-East Asian states, the Netherlands and Flanders (the northern, Dutch-
speaking part of Belgium), together known as the Low Countries, seem to be fascinated by the 
success of high-technology districts and the prevailing ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ in the United 
States (US). Inspired by the vision and experiences with dynamic entrepreneurship and cluster 
formation across the Atlantic, they have come up with suggestions to promote innovation and 
new business formation, and create fast growing firms and successful techno-industrial 
networks in the field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and 
biotechnology. With the example of Silicon Valley, the Dutch and the Flemish seek to 
emulate their structures, cultures and networking dynamic. The inspiration and imitation goes 
so far that the names given for these new ICT-districts in the Low Countries refer to either 
Silicon or Valley: Silicon Polder (the Netherlands in general), Amsterdam Alley, Dommel 
Valley, DSP Valley and Flanders Language Valley. The only high-technology region in the 
Netherlands and Flanders yet without a valley or silicon in its name is the Twente region in 
the Eastern part of the Netherlands. 
 
In this contribution we will focus on the process of regional clustering in the Netherlands and 
Flanders around the exploration and exploitation of Internet and ICT. Key questions for 
policy-makers and captains of industry in those countries in this respect are:  
- is it possible to emulate the success of Silicon Valley? 
- and what are the preconditions for growing another Silicon Valley in the Netherlands 
and Flanders?  
In Silicon Valley in de Polder: ICT-clusters in the Low Countries (Bouwman & Hulsink 
2000a), the analysis of Silicon Valley has lead to a dynamic model for the analysis of ICT-
clustering. In this respect we introduce a number of criteria that are relevant to the success of 
technology-clusters, namely a knowledge/technology core, a pool of trained professionals and 
(nascent) entrepreneurs, a sophisticated supporting infrastructure, and network dynamics (e.g. 
creation of spin-offs, job hopping, subcontracting, knowledge transfer). We want to use this 
model to make a critical analysis of five (emerging) ICT-clusters in the Netherlands (NL) and 
the Flanders region in Belgium (FL): Dommel Valley Eindhoven (NL), Amsterdam Alley 
(NL), Flanders Language Valley – Ypres (FL), Twente – Enschede (NL) and the Louvain 
Technology Corridor (FL) (see figure 1). Before comparing these regions with one another, 
we will first give a brief introduction to the particularities of high-technology 
entrepreneurship and clustering in Western Europe  
Amsterdam Twente
Eindhoven
LouvainYpres
 
              figure 1: Silicon Polders in the Netherlands and Flanders 
 
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CLUSTERING IN EUROPE 
 
In order to stimulate economic growth and employment and strengthen the competitiveness of 
European high-technology industries, authorities have recently sought to improve 
entrepreneurship, market dynamism and the institutional environment for their small and 
medium-sized businesses. The background for these plans is Europe’s poor record on 
innovation and entrepreneurship in general, and a lagging rate of new enterprise formation 
and fast growth companies, especially when compared with the USA. Comparisons of the 
level of entrepreneurship between the USA and Western Europe should be made with great 
care, given the difference in terms of the size of the national economies (e.g. large (USA, 
medium-sized (Germany) and small (The Netherlands and Belgium) and the definitions used 
in measuring the phenomenon. On the basis of an operationalisation of the level of 
entrepreneurship in terms of self-employment as share in the nation’s labour force, Audretsch 
et al.(2002) have found that from the early 1990s, when the difference between the USA and 
the West European countries was at its maximum (i.e. level of entrepreneurship being higher 
in the USA than in Europe). From that moment on, The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany 
among others have started to narrow the gap and were almost level at the turn of the century. 
For instance, while in the USA, a large minority of the people have participated in business 
start-ups (8,5 % of the adults), in Europe there is a small minority involved in setting up their 
own business (2,4%) (GEM, 2001). When comparing the USA and the European Union in 
terms of the availability of dynamic companies (i.e. fast growth companies as a percentage of 
all mid-sized companies), the rates are 19 %  and 4 %, respectively (UNICE, 1999). In short, 
attitudes towards entrepreneurship differ: while in the USA entrepreneurs are worshipped 
(e.g. ‘the pioneering spirits’), entrepreneurs in Europe are treated indifferently (almost like 
second-class citizens); instead most attention is given to large corporations and public 
employment (Muzyka et al., 2000). In the annual benchmark on conditions for 
entrepreneurship conducted by Andersen & Growth Plus (2000), the USA and the United 
Kingdom stand out, in terms of access to finance, incentive structures (e.g. remuneration, 
stock options), a favourable business environment (e.g. tax levels), clearly ahead of the 
Continental European countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, France or Germany. 
 
The reasons for Europe’s under-performing economy mentioned in official policy documents 
are (CEC 1998, 1997, 1995; Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1999):  
• heavy administrative burden on business in general and SMEs in particular and rigid 
government regulations: cost and bureaucracy involved in registering, starting-up and 
ceasing a business; high taxes (e.g. corporation tax, tax on dividends, levying of wage tax 
and payment of social premiums); inflexible labour legislation, and protected and 
oversubsidised product markets; 
• the high economic and socials costs of failure: while in the USA bankruptcy is part of a 
learning-by-doing exercise in setting up a business, entrepreneurs in Europe are more 
worried about a loss in their social security provisions and the social stigma of being a 
‘loser’ in case of a commercial failure;  
• an underdeveloped enterprise culture in Europe with a poor commercial exploitation of 
existing knowledge with a low level of (high-technology) start-ups, and low numbers of 
management buy-outs and university spin-offs;  
• bottlenecks in obtaining finance for new venture and sustainable growth: strong 
dependence on bank lending (in stead of equity financing), and a reluctance of many 
founder-entrepreneurs to dilute ownership, which equity financing requires. 
 
To improve Europe’s economic performance and to encourage a thriving enterprise culture, 
the Commission, for instance, suggested a number of measures (CEC 1998). At first, the 
European Commission strongly recommended to simplify the administrative environment by 
streamlining legislation (e.g. registration, bankruptcy laws) and reduce the number of 
compulsory procedures. Secondly, the Commission sought to make taxation systems more 
business friendly: e.g tax relief for new businesses, tax incentives for business angels and 
fiscal promotion of managed buy-outs. Thirdly, the Commission suggested to improve access 
to finance through fiscal measures aimed at the promotion of loan guarantee schemes, the 
encouragement of venture capitalists, private investors and pension funds providing risk 
capital or capital matching requirements, and the creation of second-tier stock markets (e.g. 
Neuer Markt, EASDAQ, etc.). Finally, the Commission advocated a major upgrade of 
Europe’s knowledge and skill base by fostering ‘entrepreneurialism’ and creativity in schools, 
promoting training schemes, and facilitating participation of small businesses in the R&D 
programmes of the European Union. 
 
The fact that (Continental) Europe has a lower rate of business creation than the US (and the 
UK) is often explained by referring to the highly dynamic and transparent capital market that 
has become extremely efficient at channelling capital at low cost and quickly to ambitious 
start-up businesses (Cowie, 1999). In other words, the availability of venture capital provides 
US high technology entrepreneurs with superior access to equity and debt finance.1 
Furthermore, US venture capital funds have stronger capabilities in assessing ICT and 
biotechnology start-ups: many of those funds are run by experienced (former) entrepreneurs 
and industrialists (Gupta 2000). Besides giving the financing of start-up companies no priority 
and lacking the skills to evaluate new technology-based firms, Continental European venture 
capitalists invest in foreign high-technology and bio-technology stock.2 Compared with the 
US where there is a tradition of equity financing in the high technology industries, European 
small and medium sized firms are reluctant to dilute ownership to allow for sharing equity in 
order to enable growth and long-term viability (ENSR/EIM 1995). While in the US, informal 
investors and venture capitalist play a prominent role in the seed and early growth phase of 
                                                 
1 While in the mid-1990s the US venture capital industry invested on average 35% of its funds in early stage 
business formation, the bulk of European venture capital was invested in sunset industries and in deals to 
facilitate corporate and/or industrial restructuring in later stages (Financial Times 25 November 1997).  
2 For instance, major Dutch venture capitalists invested in the mid-1990s on average 70 per cent of their ICT 
money outside the Netherlands and only 16% of their ICT is allocated to seed and start-up companies (Booz-
Allen & Hamilton 1998). 
the start-up company, in Europe the majority of external financing for small and medium-
sized firms is provided by banks, who tend to favour secured lending and other risk-averse 
investments (Bouwman 1999). 
 
 
A DYNAMIC MODEL FOR ICT CLUSTERING 
 
The geographical structure of high technology industries is often very concentrated, with a 
multitude of linkages between core firms, their spin-offs and local subcontractors, top-class 
universities and major research centres, and local/regional authorities and with extra-firm 
institutions providing collective goods (Roberts 1991. To describe the growth of a successful 
techno-industrial-scientific complex (e.g. technology parks, science cities, and techno-
industrial districts) such as Route 128 or Silicon Valley, Castells & Hall (1994) have 
introduced the concepts of milieux of innovation and technopoles. The first has been defined 
as ‘social, institutional, organisational, economic and territorial structures that create the 
conditions for the continuous generation of synergy, (..) both for the units of production that 
are part of the milieu and for the milieu as a whole (p.9).’ The second, refers to ‘various 
deliberate attempts to plan and promote within one concentrated area, technologically 
innovative, industrial-related production (p.8).’ There have been various attempts to create 
and develop technopoles (or science & technology cities and business parks) all around the 
world, in which technologically innovative, industrial-related production is planned and 
promoted within one concentrated area. According to Castells & Hall, such a technopole 
policy serves three purposes: to develop new industries as a national policy (re-
industrialisation: attracting investment), to regenerate a declining or stagnant region (regional 
development), and to develop a milieu of innovation (scienctific & technological excellence). 
Those goals are sought to be achieved by furthering collaboration between leading research 
universities, corporate laboratories, core firms with their subcontractors and spin-offs, and 
venture capitalists.  
 
Probably the most inspirational and well-known milieux of innovation is Silicon Valley, 
Northern California; other illustrations are Route 128 (Massachusetts) and Silicon Alley (New 
York) (Rosegrant & Lampe 1992; Saxenian 1994; Bouwman & Hulsink 2000a: Ch.2; 
Braczyk et al. 1999: Chs. 2,4 & 5). Silicon Valley, located in between San Francisco and San 
José, has Stanford and Berkeley as its most important universities and Hewlett & Packard, 
Intel, Apple, SUN, Oracle and Yahoo! as its indigenous key players (Lee et al., 2000; Kenney 
2000). Through the active encouragement of ‘academic entrepreneurs’ such as Frederick 
Terman (former Dean of Engineering at Stanford University), William Shockley (Nobel Prize 
winner, who set up a business to commercialise the transistor), and the tandem Gordon Moore 
& Robert Noyce (together with venture capitalist Arthur Rock co-founders of Fairchild 
Semiconductor and Intel), a dynamic techno-industrial setting of excellence took shape in 
Silicon Valley, where knowledge, people and funds were constantly transferred from one firm 
to another. The availability of large cost-plus research contracts with the Department of 
Defence and NASA in the 1960s and 1970s, the establishment of the Stanford Industrial Park 
hosting several privileged firms and R&D establishments, further contributed to the success of 
Silicon Valley.  
 
Leading companies from the West Coast that have contributed to American leadership include 
among others Hewlett-Packard (HP), Apple, Intel, SUN, Cisco, Netscape, and Silicon 
Graphics. While HP, Varian Associates (and to a certain extent Shockley) were spin-offs from 
Stanford University, the first generation of Silicon Valley companies gave way to a next 
generation of spin-offs, including Fairchild Semiconductor, and eventually to another wave of 
spin-offs, including Intel, National Semiconductors, AMD. Later, the fist waves of spin-offs, 
were followed by a new generations of spin-off companies and start-ups working in personal 
and desktop computing (e.g. Apple and SUN), networking (Cisco) and Internet technology 
(Netscape, Yahoo and Google). Before setting up their own business, most of the leading 
‘entrepreneurial’ scientists and engineers from Silicon Valley have had their education at 
Stanford University and have worked in a corporate R&D Lab (e.g. the almost legendary Palo 
Alto Reserch Center (PARC) of Rank Xerox and/or in a senior management position in an 
established company (e.g. HP, Intel). 
 
Route 128 is named after the highway near Boston along which the main companies (e.g. 
Raytheon, DEC, Wang, Data General) and knowledge institutions (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) and Harvard University), are located. Silicon Alley is the area of 
Manhattan (New York) where many dynamic Internet and electronic commerce companies 
are concentrated. All of the three regions discussed above are based on the spontaneous cross-
fertilisation between local universities and research laboratories and established high-
technology companies through dominant practices such as subcontracting research and 
product development, churning out of new firms, permanent intra- and entrepreneurship, and 
practising cross-fertilisation and knowledge diffusion by job hopping and spin-offs (Saxenian 
1994; Kenney & Von Burg 1999; Kenney, 2000; Lee et al., 2000). 
 
As shown in several studies (e.g. Castells & Hall 1994), those deliberate strategies to plan and 
promote local/regional techno-poles, shows at its best, mixed results. As shown by the success 
stories of Silicon Valley and the Route 128/MIT area, successful technopoles can come about, 
due to an emergent strategy, instead of central and/or regional planning. In setting up those 
effective public-private networks and ties between entrepreneurs, technologists and business 
angels, leading universities play a pivotal role by not only generating new basic and applied 
knowledge and producing a well-trained workforce of engineers and managers, but also act as 
a catalyst by actively supporting the process of spinning-off its research into a network of 
industrial firms and business ventures. Successful companies are spinning a web of affiliates, 
including business/technology partners and dedicated subcontractors, around a shared value 
platform or industry standard in order to promote continuous innovation and seek leverage of 
the ‘strategic network’ as such. For instance, Apple’s network consists of specialised 
suppliers that produce, for example, only switches, software, disk drives, microprocessors or 
keyboards. Apple itself is responsible for design and marketing, and for the production of core 
components and the assembly of the computers. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
in the high technology industries (ICT, new materials and bio-technology) are a breeding 
ground for innovation, job creation and economic growth. Much of the development, 
implementation and diffusion of these knowledge-intensive goods and services is carried out 
by small enterprises, who either act as local subcontractors to major internationally active 
companies or are independent in serving international niche markets.  
 
In the creation of a lasting concentration of economic activity in a specific geographical area a 
number of aspects play a role. Important parts of such a high-tech cluster are (Van de Ven 
1993; Elfring, 1999; Kenney, 2000; Lee et al., 2000): 
 universities and the R&D departments of large companies (for the churning out of 
scientific research findings and knowledge which can be applied commercially); 
 a pool of of competent human resources (highly trained entrepreneurs and professionals); 
 a sophisticated supporting infrastructure (e.g. a variety of financing mechanisms, 
incubators and investors); 
 network dynamics (e.g. the reclycing of ideas, firms, moneys and human capital: 
technology transfer, job hopping, subcontracting, spinning out & spinning in). 
 University and research laboratories 
 
If a region wishes to profile itself as a high-tech region, there has to be attention for a specific 
technology. An important element in the development of successful clusters is, therefore, the 
presence of knowledge institutions that are part of the national and international elite. Starting 
entrepreneurs are usually educated at universities that play an important role in prominent 
fundamental and applied research. Academic entrepreneurs appropriate basic knowledge from 
the public domain and transform it into proprietary knowledge through applied R&D work in 
areas related to a technological innovation (Van de Ven 1993; Roberts 1991). Also important 
is the role that is played by central core companies that appropriate, propagate and use 
technological innovations (e.g. new products, prototypes, applications etc.). Large vertically 
integrated companies, however, do not always succeed in accurately assessing and marketing 
their technological advantage, examples of which are Xerox and Philips (Hiltzik 2000; Metze 
1991). Although these companies can take credit for a large number of innovations (for 
example, the computer mouse, graphic interface, VCR-technology, CD-I technology, HDTV), 
they have not been able to translate them into market success. Young companies, on the other 
hand, are more capable of playing an innovative and catalysing role within ICT-clusters. 
 
Highly trained professionals 
 
In Silicon Valley, Stanford is one of the leading universities attracting studens from the 
United States and the rest of the world. Stanford, UC Berkeley and the other universities in 
the region produce a continuous flow of highly educated professionals in various fields. Some 
of the graduates start their own companies, but the majority finds a job at one of the many 
companies in the region. The influx of new talent is important, as newcomers will bring with 
them unorthodox views and other contacts. The international background of many students 
increases the diversity and opens up new networks in unexpected ways. Asian students, for 
example, established renewed contacts with the low wage countries in Asia when they started 
working in the high-tech companies in Silicon Valley. This process has partly resulted in a 
brainflow towards Silicon Valley, but is has also started inverse processes. Not only does 
knowledge find its way back to South-east Asia, but there is also a growing stream of venture 
capital from Asian entrepreneurs that are successful in Silicon Valley, available for native 
starters in places like Bangalore Plateau (India), Singapore and Taiwan.  
 A sophisticated supporting infrastructure 
 
ICT-starters do not operate in a vacuum. The economic activities of technological companies 
are embedded in socio-economic networks and in more or less formal structures (Grabher 
1993). Successful start-ups usually participate in more or less decentralised production 
networks, within which lasting and mutual transactions take place between specialised and 
complementary companies. These decentralised production networks can also be found in 
Silicon Valley (e.g. Apple and Cisco). Within the (emerging) ICT-cluster, venture capitalists 
play an important role. In the early stages, new companies are usually financed in a haphazard 
and opportunistic way. Depending on their need for capital, starting entrepreneurs usually 
bring in their own savings and house(s) (i.e. mortgages), funds provided by friends and 
relatives and/or a loan from the bank. The need for capital in the ICT-sector is enormous, 
especially due to the high costs involved in writing software, acquiring advanced machinery 
and organising content. A starting company will usually not be able to survive and it will have 
to look for additional investments, for example from informal investors and venture 
capitalists. Whereas informal investors tend to invest in starting companies (the bambi’s), 
venture capitalists favour fast-growing companies (the gazelles) on their way to maturity. In a 
possible floatation phase or private sale enterprising pioneers and investors step back to make 
place for new management and other stockholders. In addition to capital, their input consists 
of technology and market expertise, experience with the management of starting technology 
companies and participation in a larger partner-network. Venture capitalists are network 
brokers par excellence (Gupta, 2000): they provide the missing links in the early growth of 
starting companies. By establishing new contacts with customers, distributors and new 
management they provide the young and vulnerable company with a broader techno-
economic foundation and thus increase its social legitimacy. 
 
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has set up a web of start-up ICT companies grouped 
around distinct market opportunities and with close ties to the academic world. The strategic 
goal of this so-called Twinning project was to stimulate new ICT companies in the 
Netherlands and stimulate domestic venture capital industry in general, and attack the 
‘funding and marketing gap’ as experienced by starters and initial growth companies (Booz-
Allen & Hamilton, 1998). The leading concept is ‘twinning’, referring to the promotion of 
collaboration between incubators and linking Dutch ICT companies to American - often 
Silicon Valley-based- firms to support joint research & development, production and trade. 
The Twinning Framework is based on the following elements: Twinning Centres offering 
coaching, accommodation and financing (i.e. Amsterdam, Dommel Valley Eindhoven and 
Twente Enschede have recently been appointed because of science parks and large ICT 
companies in their region), the Twinning Start Fund (government-sponsored seed/start-up 
fund for ICT entrepreneurs), and Twinning Growth Fund (a government-sponsored co-
investment fund allowing for equity financing). Roughly similar to the Dutch plans for setting 
up Twinning Centers to promote the development and exploitation of ICT are the initiatives 
of the Flemish government to establish science/technology parks in Louvain, (Flanders 
Digital Signal Processing (DSP) Valley), Ghent (Flanders Biotechnology Valley) and 
elsewhere (Van den Brande, 1995). The pivot in the first Louvain-based venture is IMEC, a 
leading inter-university R&D centre in the field of semiconductor technology, and in the 
second Ghent-based platform, the Flanders Interuniversity Biotechnology Platform (VIB) acts 
as a spider in the web of biotechnology research and an incubator of start-ups. 
 
Network dynamics 
 
Together, all the wheeling and dealing of venture capitalists, the continuous creation of start-
ups and the high level of workforce mobility, produce a rich network containing a large and 
varied number of actors. Within that network there is a process at work of increasing returns, 
a continuous growth of capital, information, creativity and entrepreneurial talent that is 
available for reinvestment (Krugman 1991; Arthur 1994; Shapiro & Varian 1999). Important 
parts of the process are talent recruitment, workforce mobility and spin-off creation. The 
floatation of Lernout & Hauspie (L&H) and the FLV Fund meant that successful 
entrepreneurship and popular capitalism in the Flemish Westhoek (the triangle Kortrijk-Lille-
Bruges) was rewarded and that, in addition, the proceeds are being reinvested in the region 
(e.g. expansion of the technology park and participation in young local companies).  
 
New technologies and (nascent) entrepreneurs meet when employees (alone or with others) 
leave a large company or university to start their own company. This kind of spin-offs usually 
is about further developing and marketing new technologies, for which the organisation they 
have left gave them insufficient room. The large majority of starters in Silicon Valley are 
spin-offs, and that process feeds and rejuvenates the high-tech cluster. Social capital plays an 
important role in dynamic processes such as the realisation of high-tech entrepreneurship 
through spin-offs. Social capital refers to the complex of local institutions, relations based on 
trust and information flows between economic actors in a region that are based on the 
historically determined culture (Cohen & Fields 1999). The horizontal networks between 
individuals, companies, collective organisations and institutions within and between which 
information is exchanged and resources shared, and the trust on which the relationships are 
based, are a regions social capital. An example of such a successful integrative platform in a 
dynamic environment is Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network (www.jointventure.org).  
 
 
AN EVALUATION OF ICT-CLUSTERS IN THE LOW COUNTRIES 
 
The extent to which Dutch and Flemish ICT-clusters will be able to emulate the success of 
Silicon Valley and other regions can be assessed on the basis of the above-mentioned criteria. 
If we use these criteria to arrive at a preliminary qualitative assessment with regards to a 
number of existing local ICT-establishements and recent initiatives in the Low Countries, five 
regions stand out (Bouwman & Hulsink 2000b): 
 Amsterdam Alley, running from Hoofddorp, through the centre of Amsterdam, via the 
science and technology park Watergraafsmeer, to Hilversum, and containing a large 
variety of multimedia companies; 
 Dommel Valley Eindhoven, home of powerhouse Philips and a small number of spin-offs 
(e.g. ASML, Simac), that have by now achieved international success as well; 
 Twente, a rising, but vulnerable ICT-region, characterised by an entrepreneurial 
university, a number of large public research establishments institutions and company 
R&D centres, heavily subsidised by local/regional, national and European governments; 
 the Louvain Technology Corridor, in which a central role is played by the Interuniversity 
Centre for Micro Electronics (IMEC) and an entrepreneurial university (Catholic 
University of Louvain: KU Leuven); 
 Flanders Language Valley (FLV) Ypres: also a prominent cluster (both for positive and 
negative reasons), around the speech and language technology company of L&H in 
Western Flanders (Ypres, Belgium).  
 
Although those five regions are well-known and established in the Low Countries, but 
internationally, they lack a reputation and a track record. Certain elements of those ICT 
clusters are unique and worth investigating, such as Dommel Valley Eindhoven, being the 
home base of Philips Electronics and its R&D centres, Amsterdam as pan-European 
Internethub and an international multimedia & publishing stronghold, and Leuven/Louvain as 
the Flemish equivalent to Cambridge UK. The other two, Twente Enschede and Flanders 
language Valley Ypres, are specialised either in a regional sense (the East of the Netherlands) 
and in a technological sense (namely speech and language technology). Besides in terms of 
familiarity, the five regions also differ in terms of their geographical, technological and 
functional built-up and in their growth dynamics. The Amsterdam region is a relatively large, 
multi-technological and diverse agglomeration and Dommel Valley Eindhoven is a medium-
sized cluster with a clear focus on ICT, electronics and software and a dedicated support 
framework. Louvain and Twente Enschede could be described as dynamic and compact mini-
clusters, where spin-off processes, innovation and growth take place, but at a smaller scale 
and at a slower pace. The FLV Ypres cluster, specialised on speech and language technology 
and built around the local high-flyer from the region, Lernout & Hauspie (L&H), with its 
R&D partners, software developers, distributors and other business partners on the corporate 
campus. With the downfall of L&H and the crisis in the ICT and speech & language sectors, 
the FLV technology park was hit hard and spatial concentration became replaced by co-
location, closures and divestments.  
 
The data of our five case studies were collected on the basis of desk research (government 
reports, policy papers, etc.), statistics and databases from the national and functional statistical 
offices (CBS, NIS, RSZ) and trade associations (e.g. Agoria). Also interviews with a small 
group of stakeholders, normally including representatives from a flagship companies and 
smaller more specialised firms, local government officials, and spokespeople of knowledge 
centres and chambers of commerce, provided valuable information. 
 
Table 1: Key data Amsterdam 
region 
Eindhoven 
region 
Enschede 
region 
Louvain 
region 
Ypres 
region 
Population 1.200.000 500.000 300.000 100.000 50.000 
Number of ICT firms 
(CBS, NIS, SZ) 
6.000 1.100 750 150 40 
 
 
Amsterdam Alley 
 
The Amsterdam-based ICT-cluster is characterised by the unique combination of elements 
that can be found in Silicon Valley and New York’s Silicon Alley. Like Silicon Valley, 
Amsterdam Alley is technology-oriented. This holds true both for the knowledge 
infrastructure, which is centred around the government-funded Centre for Mathematics and 
Information (CWI) and the National Institute for Nuclear Physics and High Energy Physics 
(NIKHEF). Both institutes, together with the city’s two universities’ computer centre SARA, 
have been involved almost from the outset in the developments concerning the Internet. It is 
hardly surprising, then, that the link-up to the Internet’s backbone (the Amsterdam Internet 
eXchange or AMSIX) is located on the premises of SARA and NIKHEF (physically speaking 
there are two collocation points). In due course a third collocation point will be opened. The 
two research centres CWI and NIKHEF have their premises at the Amsterdam Science Park 
(Watergraafsmeer); another relevant organisation located at the Science Park is the 
aforementioned Twinning, an incubator that is partly funded by the national government. 
Around 100 start-ups have already used the services of the Science Park. 
 
An important spin-off of CWI-NIKHEF was NLnet, the first commercial Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) that started in the early 1980s. By now, NLnet has become a part of 
MCI/Worldcom. In the early 1990s other ISPs like XS4ALL (set up by hackers) and Planet 
Internet (set up by graduates from the University of Amsterdam) followed in its footsteps. 
Since the liberalisation of the telecommunications market a number of large (among others 
MCI WorlCom, Telfort/BT, Equant) and small (among others Versatel, Colt Telecom, UPC) 
have opted in favour of locating themselves in the vicinity of the financial district and the 
media and advertising cluster in and near Amsterdam. The telecommunications companies in 
turn attract other players. In 1999, Cisco has chosen Amsterdam for establishing its European 
headquarters because it wanted to be near one of its largest customers, namely WorldCom 
(apparently the former number one Internet company was also lured to Amsterdam by an 
attractive fiscal package). Less than two years later, the situation is completely different for 
the two companies. Cisco is using less than a third of its office premises; instead of preparing 
space for 5000 employees, Cisco still has less than 1500 workers in Amsterdam. As a 
consequence of the ICT-crisis of 2001 and after, also Worldcom had to scale back its growth 
activities. 
 
Amsterdam has also several things in common with the multimedia and software cluster in 
downtown Manhattan, New York. In addition to the telecommunications infrastructure, 
Amsterdam and its immediate environment houses such companies as Adobe, Nortel, 
PeopleSoft, and @Home. According to the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce, the total 
number of companies in the ICT-cluster in 1999 was 3705. At the more creative end, 
especially projects like the Digital City and activities surrounding the community centres De 
Balie (culture & theatre) and De Waag, where the Society for New and Old Media is located, 
have contributed to the familiarity and acceptance of the Internet in the early 1990s. All kinds 
of activities in the fields of culture and advertising have contributed to the creation of a whole 
new industry in Amsterdam: the multimedia sector. The presence of the Amsterdam New 
Media Association (www.anma.org), bringing together parties that are active in the area of 
new media and ICT in the Amsterdam region, stimulates the formation of a network of 
companies. 
 
The sector is still young, and it is as yet hard to say anything about the number of companies, 
the number of employees or turnover statistics. There are indications, based on research 
conducted in 1998, that around 1,300 companies are in some way active in the field of 
multimedia content production and distribution. The majority of the companies is also active 
in other areas. The number of ‘pure’ multimedia companies is limited. Turnover figures 
indicate that the Amsterdam multimedia sector has a large number of small companies. Just 
over a quarter of the companies has a turnover (both from multimedia and other activities) of 
less than 70.000 Euro. The business model of these companies can be compared to the one 
used by dot.com companies in Silicon Valley. Larger companies are predominantly concerned 
with content and publishing. To provide an indication of the total multimedia turnover with 
regard to multimedia products and services, we have multiplied the average turnover by the 
number of companies in the multimedia sector. The result is a total turnover of over 450 
mEuro. Almost 40% of that turnover is realised in the content phase, one sixth in the 
publishing phase, one seventh in the distribution phase and over one tenth in the phase of user 
support. The remainder is related to research and consultancy. 
 
Dommel Valley 
 
The medium-sized city of Eindhoven likes to call itself the Technopolis of the Netherlands. 
The reason for this is the presence of many international companies (Philips, ASML, Océ, 
DAF and NedCar), the high level of education among the professional population and the 
presence of knowledge institutions like the Technical University of Eindhoven, Fontys 
Polytechnics, Philips NatLabs, Microcentrum Nederland, TNO Industries, The design 
Academy and the European Design Centre. It is the region with the highest technological 
potential where a great deal of attention is paid to product innovation. Of the total national 
budget for R&D, 50% is said to go to this region (www.rede.nl). In international terms the 
region is very significant as well. The electro-technical industry is strongly represented in 
Dommel Vally Eindhoven and the surrounding area: it is the (de facto) home base of global 
market leaders Philips and ASML. High-tech companies are also strongly respresented: 25% 
of the regions companies fall within this category, compared to a national average of 12%. 
 
If we see Dommel Valley Eindhoven as an ICT-cluster, we must recognise that Dommel 
Valley Eindhoven is dominated by a few large vertically integrated organisations. These 
organisations are inter-related. ASML Lithography and Simac have been churned out by 
Philips. Apart from these three companies, Philips hardly produces any spin-offs at all. Philips 
is especially internally oriented and, as a consequence, its knowledge/technology transfer 
programme is limited: research activities and business development are concentrated on the 
Philips high-tech campus or carried out within the company and its many divisions. In 
Dommel Valley Eindhoven, there are a few interesting multimedia companies such as 
Calibre, active in the field of interactive visualisation and simulation, Ilse, the Dutch search 
engine, currently owned by Amsterdam-based publisher VNU, and Turpin Vision and Codim. 
The latter two are active in the area of digital animation production for CD-ROM and the 
Internet. In all, some 1,200 companies are said to be active in the ICT domain. The majority 
of these companies, however, has a traditional profile and has emerged from the automation, 
graphic or marketing communication sectors. There is hardly a dynamic to speak of that has 
to do with starting companies around the Eindhoven-based ICT-cluster. For instance, the 
Twinning subsidiary, located at the campus of the Technical University, has great difficulties 
finding companies that are interested. 
 
The question is what may be expected from Philips’ high-tech campus, centred around its 
famous NatLabs, as a catalyst for the local economy. At first sight, it seems to be first and 
foremost an impulse for the internal R&D-activities of Philips itself. Cooperation with the 
Technical University of Eindhoven, the concentration of the number of employees and the 
influx of (international) talent means that one of the conditions for the creation of a successful 
cluster is apparently met. However, the other two aspects, a supporting infrastructure and 
network dynamics, are less evident. There is no highly developed network in which start-ups 
can participate. Existing networks are being dominated too much by the region’s key player 
Philips. Although there are investors and investment companies active in the region, and both 
the local investment company NV Rede and the incubator Twinning have a venture capital 
fund, these opportunities are hardly used by starting companies. 
 
Twente Enschede 
 
Twente’s ICT-cluster can be especially characterised as an R&D-cluster. The number of 
companies and public organisations for which ICT is an important part of business is around 
200. In 1997, around 6,000 people were employed in Twente’s ICT-sector (including the 
knowledge institutions). Around 40% of these are working at a limited number of institutions, 
namely at (parts of) Signaal, Ericsson and knowledge institutions (Twente Polytechnic, the 
Telematics Institute, a public-private partnership between government, universities and 
businesses, and the University of Twente). The ICT value chain is fairly balanced. It contains 
network owners (for example, the national telecom operator KPN and the regional cable 
company CasTel), hardware manufacturers (for example Fluke Industrial BV) developers of 
telecommunications equipment (for example Ericsson and De Haar Telecom) and software 
producers (for example V&L, Matrix and Origin). Many small ICT-companies that have 
emerged from the knowledge infrastructure, are growing very rapidly. The role played by the 
knowledge infrastructure is a large one, not only because of the presence of the knowledge 
institutions mentioned earlier. There is also a large number of companies that have opened an 
R&D subsidiary in the vicinity of the University of Twente (close to Enschede); examples of 
this are CMG-Telecommunications, Lucent Technologies, TNO-FEL and KPN-Research. The 
emphasis, therefore, is on research, design and development. This cluster is rather vulnerable 
due to cyclical influences when R&D organisations cut in R&D. Actually, during the recent 
downturn (2002), Ericsson stopped all its R&D activities in Twente. 
 
There is no clearly defined user community in Twente, although organisations like the 
Foundation Teleport Twente, the Technology Circle Twente and the Twinning Centre (their 
3rd subsidiary) do play a modest role. The engines behind developments in the area of ICT are 
especially the university, the Overijssel Development and Investment company (OOM), the 
municipality of Enschede and the Province of Overijssel. Some of these parties are involved, 
for example, in the development of NDIX, the Dutch-German Internet Exchange. Other 
relevant initiatives are: 
 the Temporary Entrepreneur Places scheme, aimed at helping starting entrepreneurs to 
build their company. 1999, 35 to 40 companies started with the help of this scheme. 
Around 40% of the companies was active in the field of ICT. Knowledge diffusion from 
science to the business community is an important objective. 
 the Technological Spearheads project, aimed at attractive high-quality technological 
companies, a project that fits in with the university’s technological spearheads. The 
companies are being located in the ‘Business & Science Park’, or in the immediate 
vicinity of the university. One of the spearheads is telematics (next to laser technology, 
biomedical technology and microsystems technology). 
 the Palo Alto project is aimed at matching companies from Twente with companies from 
Palo Alto (Twente’s Californian twin town) to exchange knowledge and technologies and 
to do business (e.g. thanks to this project cooperation takes place between the Twente-
based OVSoftware and the American Hansen Information Technologies). 
 
Although there is a wide variety of activities to stimulate ICT in Twente, there is no coherent 
vision to connect the various initiatives. It is true that a large number of parties are taking part, 
but there is hardly any cooperation between them. Furthermore, the availability of venture 
capital and experienced (general) managers is also a bottleneck for the Twente Enschede 
region. The main focus is still on R&D what makes the region vulnerable to economic 
turbulences. 
 
Louvain Technology Corridor 
 
The pivot in the Louvain innovation network is the Catholic University of Louvain (KU 
Leuven) and IMEC, the Interuniversity Centre of Micro-Electronics linked to the university. 
In addition to being an internationally renowned knowledge centre, KU Leuven has also 
become known for its active policy with regards to academic entrepreneurship and the transfer 
of knowledge. Tangible examples of this are the creation and exploitation of a large science 
park, several innovation and incubation centres and a subsidiary for licensing and contract 
research. The Louvain region is a furtile breeding ground for young and innovative 
companies: in the course of time KU Leuven has produced nearly 40 spin-offs, a number of 
which have entered the stock-market (for example ICOS Vision Systems, LMS International, 
Netvision/Ubizen), and all of which are located on campus. In the commercialisation of 
knowledge through spin-offs and important role is played by two venture capital funds that 
KU Leuven has established with, among others, private financial investors Fortis Bank, 
GIMV and KBC: the ICT venture fund IT-Partners and the generic Gemma Frisius Fund. 
Finally, also active within this techno-academic region is the L.Inc platform (Louvain 
Innovation Networking Circle), which aims at building a bridge between innovative 
entrepreneurs, consultants, financiers and various intermediary organisations (e.g. 
accountancy & consultancy firms) in Flemish Brabant. Apart from KU Leuven and IMEC, 
there are a number of commercial parties, the City of Louvain, the regional Chamber of 
Commerce and the local utilities company that are involved in expanding the L.Inc project. 
 
Since its foundation in 1984, IMEC has built its own impressive technology portfolio and, in 
addition, has attracted a close group of leading research organisations and international 
contract partners in the field of micro-electronics. In 1999, IMEC’s total budget was 80 
mEuro (a third of which was provided by the Flemish government), with contract research 
reaching 40 mEuro. In close cooperation with large ICT-companies and organisations such as 
Philips, Alcatel, Agfa, ASML and Sematech, IMEC has established a variety of specific 
research and training programmes. The presence of these multinational companies has to 
compensate for the lack of a local core company. The other conditions for a successful high-
tech cluster have been met reasonably well. KU Leuven, the intellectual powerhouse with its 
large educational variety, produces highly trained people; as a consequence the supporting 
network can be characterised as adequate. A significant contribution to the necessary network 
dynamics has been made by the creation of the Digital Signal Processing Valley (DSP) in 
1994. DSP was established by IMEC and a number of its partners and spin-offs to create a 
catalyst for the use of digital signal processing technology in new applications, and the 
creation of a new generation of start-ups. In addition to creating spin-offs (some 20 companies 
that are still in business), IMEC’s activities are aimed at attracting foreign expertise and 
investments in the field of micro-electronics in the Louvain region. Since it was founded, DSP 
Valley has grown considerably: the number of participating companies has risen enormously 
and the number of DSP experts in the region went up from 350 in 1994 to around 1200 in 
2000. 
 
Flanders Language Valley Ypres 
 
In November 1999, the technology park of the Flanders Language Valley (FLV) was 
officially opened. This centre, situated in a rural environment near Ypres in the Western 
Corner of Belgium, was established to attract and combine knowledge, talent and investment 
in the field of speech and language technology. The FLV campus, designed in the shape of a 
human ear (the symbol for communication), houses and education centre, auditoriums, offices 
and laboratories for starting and established companies and a service zone with, among other 
things, supporting knowledge institutions (of local universities and polytechnics) and a large 
number of service companies (among other things, a bank, an employment agency, restaurant 
and a child day-care centre). At the centre of this extensive network is one of the world’s 
leading companies in the field of speech and language technology, L&H Speech Products. 
This company, originally founded by two entrepreneurs from the Western Corner of Flanders, 
Jo Lernout and Pol Hauspie, experienced a difficult pioneering phase between 1987 and 1994, 
but has grown into a ‘high-tech flyer’ listed at the New York (NASDAQ) and Brussels 
(EASDAQ) stock exchange. At the end of 2000, the company employed around 5000 people 
and had offices in a number of European and Asian countries as well as the USA. L&H, with 
a market capitalisation of around $2 billion, in 1998 realised a turnover of $ 212 million, at a 
profit of $38 million. L&H develops a range of products for speech and language technology 
in several languages and for all types of processor. Their products include automatic 
translation devices, dictation systems, various speech control applications, advanced 
applications for browsing the Internet and software designed to compress speech. L&H is one 
of the few long-term success-stories in the European ICT-industry. Since 1994, the company 
has continually doubled its yearly turnover (after a spate of aggressive acquisitions), and it is 
in business with both Microsoft and Intel (both companies hold minority stakes in L&H). 
 
L&H is strongly rooted in its region of birth, and its headquarters and extensive R&D-
activities are located there. In addition, L&H is the core company of the Flanders Language 
Valley (FLV), where at the end of 1999 nearly 20 specialised suppliers, distributors and 
customers of L&H’s technologies, have established themselves. A number of other partners 
have promised to move into the FLV business park in the foreseeable future. An important 
role in attracting investments to the technology park and promoting local knowledge transfer 
and technological dynamics is played by the FLV Fund, which specialises in investments in 
speech and language technologies. In addition to the presences of L&H as a technology 
developer, the expected synergy between L&H and its business partners in the development 
of new applications and the availability of business support and incubation services (as 
provided by the FLV Foundation), this FLV Fund, as the provider of venture capital, is the 
fourth leg of the regional innovation system of speech and language technology. In addtion to 
all this, Jo Lernout and Pol Hauspie then became actively involved in the exportation of the 
FLV concept. In November 1999, it was anounced that an international network of nine 
centres of excellence would be constructed around Flanders Language Valley (by now 
renamed SAIL Port Flanders), designed to stimulate worldwide technologies in the field of 
Speech, Artificial Intelligence & Language (SAIL) technologies. 
 
Until recently the pride of ‘High-tech Flanders’, L&H has recently become the ‘paria’ of the 
international stock markets.3 The two entrepreneurs from Western Flanders have succeeded in 
building a local clusters of partner companies and knowledge institutions around the company 
in Ypres. In addition, the company was in the process of building an international network of 
local clusters. However, recent problems with foreign investors since the Fall of 2000 are 
extremely unwelcome. It is not unthinkable that (parts of) L&H will be taken over by large 
international competitors such as IBM, Oracle or Philips, or that its non-exclusive partner 
Microsoft will take the company under its wings (or even worse, that the company will go 
bust). If that should happen it remains to be seen whether the intended campus around L&H 
and the industrial area attached to it will ever be completely filled. Partly as a result of 
imploded stock prices, commitment among L&H’s employees will decrease (share options 
have lost their value already) and people will start to vote with their feet (thus rendering the 
company’s recovery process de facto impossible). The high-tech flyer from the Low 
Countries was expecting to be for a rough ride, but now founds itself in a case of emergence, 
preparing for a rough landing. 
 
 
COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION 
 
We have briefly described a model with which we can describe and evaluate the dynamics of 
ICT-cluster formation. Based on the principle elements from that model we have assessed five 
clusters, namely Amsterdam Alley, Dommel Valley Eindhoven, Twente Enschede, the 
Louvain Technology Corridor, and Flanders Language Valley. In our view, Dommel Valley 
Eindhoven, Louvain and Amsterdam have a better starting position than Twente and Flanders 
                                                 
3 Between August and October 2000, the L&H came under attack from business journalists (especially the Wall 
Street Journal Europe!), quickly followed by auditors, and institutional investors and other shareholders about 
allegedly creative bookkeeping. After a thorough investigation by the SEC/NASDAQ, EASDAQ and an internal 
audit by KPMG in November, the company admitted severe accounting irregularities and is now facing threats 
of litigation from disgruntled shareholders. After a boardroom shuffle and a profits warning, together with the 
pending investigations, the future of the once leading and independent provider of voice and language 
technology is looking bleak with the company facing a bankruptcy. As a consequence of L&H’s being the only 
catalyst for the region, the company’s strategic partners, the FLV Fund and Flanders Language Valley, are also 
in crisis. 
Language Valley. The lack of large dynamic domestic companies that can serve as a region’s 
catalyst (Twente), and the dependence on Lernout & Hauspie, a company that has recently 
made less than favourable headlines (e.g. accounting irregularities, threat of litigation from 
disgruntled shareholders, a dramatic corporate restructuring facing bankruptcy) together with 
the lack of a central knowledge institution (Flanders Language Valley), give us reasons to 
believe these regions face a less certain future than the other three, i.e. Dommel Valley 
Eindhoven, Louvain and Amsterdam. 
 
Table 2: Evaluation of High tech-clusters in the Netherlands and Flanders 
 
 Amsterdam 
Alley 
Dommel 
Valley  
Eindhoven 
Twente 
Enschede 
Louvain 
Technology 
Corridor 
Flanders 
Language 
Valley 
Core of 
knowledge: 
- universities 
- flagship 
companies 
sufficient/good 
(universities), 
many start-ups, 
foreign 
subsidiaries 
good:  
Philips NatLab 
& TU 
Eindhoven 
sufficient/good: 
Uni Twente, 
public/private 
R&D Labs 
Sufficient:  
KU Leuven, no 
core company few 
foreign 
companies 
good but very 
specialised 
(L&H, no 
university) 
Pool of 
Professionals 
high variety of 
professionals 
some variety 
(no life 
sciences) 
skewed towards 
engineers, few 
marketing & sales 
people 
high variety (all 
disciplines 
available) 
skewed: 
medium- level 
locally available, 
high-level 
recruited 
elsewhere 
Support 
infrastructure 
sufficient: 
several 
incubators, 
science park, 
little venture 
capital, 
presence of 
leading users 
limited: little 
venture capital 
available 
Moderate 
incubators, 
science park, no 
venture capital, 
dependence on 
subsidies 
solid: fully 
developed & thick 
network 
targeted towards 
one company & 
one technology 
Network 
dynamics 
good (mixture 
of indigenous 
forces & 
foreign inputs 
limited (no 
spin-offs & 
foreign 
investments) 
confined to 
regional dynamics
good (spin-offs + 
foreign 
establishments) 
volatile & 
vulnerable to 
success & 
failure 
 
On the basis of an initial qualitative assessment (see table 2) we have to conclude that the 
(further) growth potential of Twente is as yet unclear. Twente is a developing region where 
R&D and innovation play an important role, above all stimulated by a promising knowledge 
infrastructure (a number of large technology institutes and companies’ research laboratories), 
but which is presently handicapped by its peripheral location and a conservative local culture. 
The lack of a number of important core companies and key venture capital firms that could 
serve as a catalyst to the region, are also notably absent. 
 
Dommel Valley Eindhoven and Amsterdam would appear to have better chances of becoming 
successful high-tech clusters. Dommel Valley Eindhoven is dominated by one large and 
vertically integrated company (Philips), which may have at its disposal high-quality expertise, 
but which does not sufficiently market its technology. In addition, regional-economic 
dynamics are limited, and there is relatively little outsourcing taking place within the ICT-
domain, there is little cooperation with suppliers, and the number of spin-offs from the mother 
company is low. The spin-offs that do take place are very successful. Based on our initial 
assessment we must conclude that Amsterdam has a good chance of becoming a successful 
high-tech cluster, especially thanks to the strong emphasis on innovation (both in terms of 
technology and services), the presence of (highly) educated professionals, an advanced 
supporting infrastructure and the presence of large foreign ICT-players in the region. With the 
exception of venture capital, which has hardly found its way to Amsterdam and the 
availability of successful entrepreneurs that can serve as role models and informal investors to 
the new generation, Amsterdam Alley faces an optimistic future. 
 
Two years ago, the two high-tech clusters in Flanders had great potential to develop into 
international specialised technology regions. After the collapse of L&H and the Flanders 
Language Fund, the momentum of the Flanders Language Valley has subsided, leaving a 
question mark over the future of the core company of L&H, the local speech and language 
technology-cluster and the dynamic Flemish Western Corner region. The evolution of the core 
company L&H in the Flanders Language Valley offers a perfect illustration of the law of 
increasing returns: while the company in its successful growth and expansion period benefited 
from a ‘virtuous circle’ (success breeds its own success), in its current crisis the company 
seems to be faced with a ‘vicious circle’ (if things go wrong they really go wrong). For the 
region as such the slimming down of L&H does not necessarily have to be a bad thing: the 
failure of Shockley and Fairchild in the 1950s and 1960s helped create a new generation of 
core companies in Silicon Valley (a.o. Intel and National Semiconductor). For the Flemish 
region it might even turn out to be a blessing in disguise, if former L&H employees move to 
smaller local partner companies or even start their own companies. This way, the region 
would be less dependent on a single large company. The Louvain Technology Corridor has a 
number of interesting elements that make the region ‘promising’: an innovative university, 
that is not only part of the European knowledge elite in a number of areas, but that also 
actively promotes entrepreneurship and the transfer of knowledge. However, the Louvain 
Technology Corridor lacks a certain balance. Whereas IMEC, with its international and local 
research partners, has developed a successful mini-cluster around microchip technology (i.e. 
DSP Valley), specialised around other technologies are as yet insufficiently developed. 
 
If we look at the lessons learned from the case studies on those clusters than a couple of 
things stand out: the extreme vulnerability of an emerging technologically specialised cluster, 
being too dependent on one leading company and on the business cycles in the larger industy. 
As the cases of the mini-clusters of Louvain and Twente Enschede illustrate, small scale is not 
a disadvantage provided if there is an active and dynamic university and associated R&D 
centres supporting academic entrepreneurship, local knowledge transfer and regional 
development. Amsterdam Alley, and to a certain extent Dommel Valley Eindhoven, indicate 
the importance of Jacobs & Glaeser’s argument (discussed in the beginning of this chapter) 
that local competition and techno-industrial variety matter (more than technological 
specialisation). The diversified city region of Amsterdam and the diversified power house of 
Philips provide ample opportunities of intra- and inter-industry learning, cross-fertilisation 
and all kind of spillover and network effects. These diversified regional systems with a broad 
portfolio of (potential) activities) are conducive to innovation and growth in a positive 
scenario, or, in the case of a negative scenario, may act as slack and easily provide 
alternatives. Furthermore, there appears to be a gap between the technological potential and 
the realization of that potential. The key building blocks of a cluster are a necessary condition, 
but not sufficient to realize its potential. Particular networking characteristics and capabilities 
need to be present to get the interactions between the building blocks going. These virtuous 
circles seem to be based on entrepreneurial exploration, which is facilitated by brokers and 
networks with structural holes. These variation creating mechanisms within a cluster with 
strong building blocks appears to be crucial in living up to its potential.  
 
An interesting new combination could be the transborder cluster of Louvain and Dommel 
Valley Eindhoven. These two regions, that are already connected with regards the area of 
micro-electronics and digital signal processing technology through Philips, ASML and IMEC, 
offer a greater potential for synergy (among other things, a favourable business climate for 
starters and a leading core company that can serve as incubator and as leading edge 
customer). It would, therefore, be interesting to map further the current state of affairs with 
regards to the interwovenness between Eindhoven and Louvain and to analyse the synergetic 
potential that exists between the Netherlands and Flemish Brabant. Together, these two 
regions have the potential to evolve into a transborder and internationally successful cluster. 
Will the Low Countries, with the relative success of Amsterdam and the potential of 
Eindhoven and Louvain, see the dawning of another Golden Age? 
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